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Abstract: We propose an ethical viewpoint based on the possibility of the realization of the
worst-case scenario in order to reduce future generations risks in terms of discounting. Applied to
the question of conservation of a renewable resource, we show that an economy, where the social
planner takes into account the possibility that at an uncertain date the discount rate could change
to its minimum possible value, could lead to a better conservation of the resource and modify the
position of the sacrificed generations. Finally, our model suggests to apply the lowest possible
discount rate immediately for long term environmental projects.
Résumé: Nous proposons une approche basée sur la possibilité de la réalisation du pire scénario
pour réduire les risques encourus par les générations futures en termes de taux d’actualisation
dès maintenant. Appliquée à la question de la préservation d’une ressource renouvelable, nous
montrons qu’une économie dans laquelle le planificateur social prend en compte la possibilité d’un
changement du taux d’actualisation à sa valeur minimale à une date future incertaine peut conduire
à une meilleure préservation de la ressource et modifier la position des générations sacrifiées.
Finalement, notre modèle suggère d’appliquer le taux le plus faible possible dès aujourd’hui pour
des projets environnementaux de long terme.
Keywords: Discounting; Environment; Uncertainty; Preservation of natural resources; Inter-
generational equity.
Mots clés: Escompte; Environnement; Incertitude; Préservation; Equité intergénérationnelle.
Classification JEL: O4, Q2, D80
1 Introduction
Long-lasting environmental phenomena such as global climate change, radioactive waste disposal,
minerals depletion, and loss of biodiversity have raised the question of our ability to discount
properly environmental projects which eﬀects will be spread out over hundred of years. This
question involve to a large extent the uncertainty conveyed by the distant future as it may have
an impact on both the future of society as featured by Gollier (2002) and Weitzman (1999) and
the attitude of future generations towards environmental assets.
In the literature, the eﬀect of uncertainty on future preferences on conservation decisions has
been mainly investigated from the viewpoint of changes on the utility function. The main ques-
tion addressed is to consider the possibility that future generations have stronger preference for
environmental goods. That is to say, future generations may value natural resources and envi-
ronmental assets quite diﬀerently than we do today. In seminal studies of this issue, Beltratti,
Chichilnisky and Heal (1993), and Ayong Le Kama (2001) study the eﬀect of change in preferences
in the future at an unknown date on the optimal use of natural resource. They consider a model
in which the unique source of welfare is consumption, derived from the depletion of an exhaustible
natural resource. They show that when the central planner expects that the preferences of future
generations will be, on average, more in favor of the environment than we do, the uncertainty on
future preferences leads to a more conservative attitude in terms of the use of resource stocks1.
The appropriate discounting of the very long term also questions strong beliefs about what
constitutes ethical behavior of current generations toward the future of generations to come. This
is about the willingness of members of current generations to bear the cost of actions that reduce
risks faced by future generations on the debate on discounting the distant future and the intergen-
erational resource allocation. This led Arrow (1999) to assert that the problem of discounting for
projects with payoﬀ in the far future is largely ethical. This paper is also made from an ethical
viewpoint and argues that it is important to clarify the normative grounds under which the choice
of social discount rate is made. We propose an approach based on the possibility of the realization
of the worst-case scenario in order to reduce future generations risks in terms of discounting.
Planning the distant future requires taking into account accurate assumptions on the evolution of
1Beltratti, Chichilnisky and Heal (1998) develop also the case in which the stock of exhaustible resource and
consumption enter in a separable way into the utility function. They reach the same result since in that case, the
marginal utility of consumption does not depend on the preference for the resource and hence it is not aﬀected by
the changes in preferences. Besides, Ayong Le Kama and Schubert (2004) develop the non separable case and show
that two kinds of behavior are possible for the decision maker. If the economy has poor prospects of growth and
a bad environmental quality, it will rather adopt a precautionary behavior and be more conservative. However, if
on the contrary, the growth path without change in preferences is favorable and the environmental quality fair, the
society will rather adopt a behavior of insurance against later depravations, consisting in consuming a great deal
now at the expenses of the environmental quality.
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relevant variables such as growth rates, technologies, resource available in order to value objectives.
Regarding environmental and economic variables, one may consider, on the one hand, an optimist
evolution with high growth rates, clean technologies, and new purpose technologies, etc.... On
the other, one may consider a pessimist evolution with low growth rates, side eﬀects of natural
resource scarcity, deterioration of the environment and decreasing returns of scale, etc.... The future
evolution of these variables is very important to well define the appropriate social discount rate. It
can be diﬃcult to define a probability distribution on the future values of these variables for such a
long of time period. Instead, it may be more intuitive to adopt the worst-case attitude to define the
social discount rate. That means to consider that the evolution of the variables is systematically
adverse and therefore to select the smallest one. The rationale behind this approach is to say
that since the worst case scenario is possible, and that if it turns to happen future generations
will support the highest possible damage. Therefore, it is then fair to apply to the social welfare
function the discount rate that allocates the highest weight to future generations well-being2.
This argument is also consistent with regard to the precautionary principle and intergenerational
equity3.
Our approach leads to another rationale for discounting the far distant future at its lowest possible
rate and therefore complements the analysis of Weitzman (1998) and Gollier (2002).
Applied to the question of the optimal use of renewable resource, we show in this paper that
when the social planner takes into account the possibility that the discount rate could change to its
minimum possible value at an uncertain date, an economy would experience a better conservation
of the resource. Moreover, this raises the question of the timing and the impact on the economy
of the change in the social discount rate that involves which generations bear the sacrifice. In
one possible case, it will not be the current generations, nor the later generations, but those that
comes just after the change in discount rate occurred that will make the sacrifice for the transition.
Moreover, the time slot for which this generation would be sacrificed could be reduced if the growth
rate of the economy adopting the worst-case scenario attitude is significantly higher than the one in
the determinist case. In another possible case, the economy which takes into account the possibility
of the change in the discount factor at an uncertain date will be more conservative in terms of
resource consumed till the change occurs. The first generations are then heavily sacrificed to pay
attention to the interest of future ones.
2The worst-case scenario we developed is based on the minimum principle approach and can be declined in an
equivalent maximin version. Therefore, one can give ethical interpretations to decisions made from the worst-case
scenario approach in a Rawlsian ethic framework of the choice of principles in uncertainty context, the veil of
ignorance.
3One can interpret our approach in terms of precautionary principle in the sense that we should not let future
generations bear the risk in terms of discounting since uncertainties belonging to the future are not resolved.
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Implicitly, our approach suggests to make the change in discount rate the sooner the better and
therefore to apply the lowest possible discount rate today. This result can be confronted to the
recommendation of the French Commissariat Général au Plan which proposes to reduce the public
discount rate from 8% to 4% at the horizon of 30 years, 3% for 100 years and about 2% beyond
that.
2 The determinist case
We consider an economy in which the stock of the resource, S, is depleted by consumption c, but
regenerates itself at the constant rate M > 0. Thus, its dynamic is written as:
.
St =MSt − ct. (1)
At time t, society derives utility from consumption and the amenity of the stock of the resource
according to the felicity function u (ct, St) which is assumed to be increasing, strictly concave with
respect to its arguments and twice continuously diﬀerentiable. Thus we assume a utility function of
the Cobb-Douglas form, such as: u (c, S) = ln c+ φ lnS, where φ stands for the relative preference
for the resource stock.
In the determinist case, the social planner applies a constant, positive and certain discount rate
all together of the infinite horizon of the economy. Therefore, the problem of the social planner
can be formulated as:
P (1) max
c,S
Z ∞
0
e−ρt(ln c+ φ lnS)dt s.t.
.
S =MSt − ct, ct ≥ 0, St ≥ 0, S0 given, (2)
where ρ is the social rate of time preference of the planner.
The solution to the problem P (1) can be written as (e.g., Ayong Le Kama and Schubert, 2004):
.c(1)
c(1)
= M − ρ+ φc
(1)
S
(3)
.
S
S
= M − c
(1)
S
. (4)
Let us define z(1) = c
(1)
S to reduce the system formed by (3) and (4) to the equation:
.z(1)
z(1)
= (φ+ 1) z(1) − ρ. (5)
The stationary solution of this equation is then given by:
z(1) = ρ
1 + φ
. (6)
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The equation is unstable, so the economy will instantaneously switch to its stationary path at
the beginning of the time horizon. In this economy, the ratio cS is constant at the level z, and c
and S growth at the same rate g(1) = M − ρ1+φ . If the social planner is patient enough so that
(1 + φ)M is higher than ρ, i.e. the degree of impatience is inferior to the rate of regeneration plus
a term taking into account the weight of the resource stock on the utility, then the economy will
be increasing along the optimal path, otherwise g is negative. Then we have c(1) (t) = c0eg
(1)t =¡
M − g(1)
¢
S0eg
(1)t.
3 The worst-case scenario approach
We suppose that there is a possibility that at a random future date T (with marginal density ωt > 0,
i.e. the probability that the discount factor changes at t is positive for any t and
R∞
0
ωtdt = 1, i.e.
the change of the discount factor happens at a finite date with certainty) the discount factor used
to valuate utility will change. It is also assumed that the change in discount factor is a once-for-all
phenomenon.
Let d (t) be the discounting factor, and assume that during the first period before T , it is
expressed by e−ρt when the social rate of time-preference applied during the first period before T
is equal to ρ > 0. Now assume that after T , the social planner chooses the social rate of time-
preference in a set of admissible rates [δmin, ρ], with 0 < δmin < ρ. We assume that δmin < ρ ∀
t > T. This assumption allows to settle that from the date T the social rate of time-preference
applied by the planner is inferior to the one before.
The choice of the social discount rate is known to be an ethical choice. Thus, we think that it
is necessary to explicit the normative grounds under which the social discount rate is established.
Our purpose is to consider that, at the very long term, taking into account the fundamental
uncertainties about the rate of economic growth, the amount of capital that will be accumulated,
the degree of diminishing returns, the level and pace of technological progress, the deterioration
of the environment, and the eﬀects of natural resource scarcity, it can be diﬃcult to define the
appropriate social discount rate. Instead, the attitude of the society can consist in privileging
an approach that preserves the well-being of that generations that bear the risk on the future.
Therefore, the social planner can consider the more adverse one as relevant scenario for the future,
and consequently adopts today the behavior that allows future generations to face more easily the
worst-case scenario4. That is to say, to apply the lowest possible social discount rate, since it is
4 See Geoﬀard (1996) for an interpretation of the worst-case scenario with the introduction of a class of utility
functions, called variational utility functions, for which the dynamics of the discount factor obeys a minimum
principle.
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the one that allows the highest weight to future generations on the welfare function. Then we can
sum up the discounting function as:
d (t) =
½
e−ρt
e−δmint
if t < T
if t ≥ T. (7)
3.1 Solution of the model after the change of the discount factor
Consider now the social planner program after the change of the discount factor. The program is
the same as the one before T , the diﬀerences are on the initial level of the stock of resource and
the social discount rate applied in this horizon. The state valuation function of a given remaining
stock ST from time T onwards is therefore given as follow:
P (2) V (ST ) = max
c,S
Z ∞
T
e−δmint(ln c+ φ lnS)dt s.t.
.
S =MSt − ct, t > T. (8)
The current value Hamiltonian can be written as H (c, S, α) = (ln c+ φ lnS) + α(MS − c).
By analogy, with the solution of the problem P (1) , we obtain for the program P (2): z(2) = δmin1+φ ,
g(2) =M − δmin1+φ and c(2) (T ) =
¡
M − g(2)
¢
ST e−g
(2)T .
We then can compute the valuation function as:
V (ST ) = (1 + φ)
e−δminT
δmin
lnST +
e−δminT
δmin
[ln
³
M − g(2)
´
+ φ(T + δmin) + δming(2)]. (9)
We also know that the marginal valuation of the stock is equal to the marginal utility of consump-
tion at time T at which the change in discount rate takes place5:
dV (ST )
dST
= αT , (10)
where αT is the shadow price of the stock ST at time T , then we have αT = u0
³
c(2)t
´
= 1
c(2)t
. The
condition (10) ensures that it is not necessary to distinguish in S the paths of P (2) and P (3)6.
3.2 Solution of the overall model
The overall problem of the social planner program when he takes into account both the uncertainty
on the date at which the change of the discount rate occurs and the change in level of the discount
rate is defined as (e.g., Dasgupta and Heal, 1974):
P (3)



max
Z ∞
0
ωT
(Z T
0
(ln c+ φ lnS) e−ρtdt+ V (ST ) e−ρT
)
dT
s.t.
.
S =MS − c, ct ≥ 0, St ≥ 0, ωT > 0 ∀t.
(11)
5For the proof, see Beltratti, Chichilnisky and Heal (1998) proposition 6.
6Therefore, we can deduce c(2)t with respect to St as: c
(2)
t =

M − g(2)

St, since there can not exist a jump in
the stock.
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Write Ωt =
Z t
0
ωτdτ and integrate by parts the maximand in (11) to reformulate the problem
P (3) as:
max
Z ∞
0
e−ρt[(ln c+ φ lnS)Ωt + ωtV (St)]dt
s.t.
.
S = MS − c, ct ≥ 0, St ≥ 0, and S0 given.
The current value Hamiltonian is then H (c, S, γ, ω,Ω) = Ω (ln c+ φ lnS) + ωV (S) + γ(MS − c),
and the first order conditions are:
Ω
1
c(3)
= γ, (12)
.γ
γ
= ρ−M − φc
(3)
S
− ωcV
0
Ω
. (13)
Diﬀerentiating the first optimality condition, using equation (13) and (10), and assuming that the
marginal density ωt of the random future date t at which the change in discount rate occurs is a
Poisson process with constant parameter λ, ωtΩt = λ ∀t, allow to display the diﬀerential equations
characterizing the evolution of the economy:
.c(3)
c(3)
= M − ρ+ φc
(3)
S
+ λ
"
1− c
(3)¡
M − g(2)
¢
S
#
(14)
.
S
S
= M − c
(3)
S
. (15)
Defining z(3) = c
(3)
S , the dynamic system formed by (14) and (15) reduces to an unique equation
in z(3) given by:
.z(3)
z(3)
= λ− ρ+
·
(φ+ 1)− λ
M − g(2)
¸
z(3). (16)
Assuming that δmin > λ, the stationary solution of this equation is then given by z(3) = δmin1+φ
ρ−λ
δmin−λ
and we obtain g(3) =M − δmin1+φ
ρ−λ
δmin−λ and c
(3)
T =
¡
M − g(3)
¢
ST .
3.3 Comparison of optimal paths
We can compare the paths of the determinist economy, P (1), and the overall model, P (3) , since
they obey to the same resource constraint. The comparison of the growth rate and initial levels of
consumption allows to determine which economy follows a path that sacrificed less generations. We
will take the trajectory of the determinist economy as the reference path. Moreover, we consider
that the social planner is more conservative in terms of resource if the ratio of the consumption on
the resource stock is lower along the economic path.
Since we assume that δmin > λ, it is straightforward to see that g(3) = M − δmin1+φ
ρ−λ
δmin−λ < g
(2) =
M − δmin1+φ since ρ > δmin. Moreover, one can see straightforwardly that g
(1) < g(2).
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For the comparison of g(3) and g(1), we must consider two cases. In case one, if δmin ρ−λδmin−λ > ρ,
then g(3) < g(1) and c(3)0 > c
(1)
0 . Thus the optimal consumption path of P (3) will remain above
the one of P (1) all the long of trajectories before the change occurs at T . At the date of the
change in discounting, the consumption level in the overall model takes down to a lower level, c(2)T ,
and hereafter grows at a higher rate g(2). Under this case, the generations coming just after T
are sacrificed in the program taking into account the change in the discount rate. This evolution
means that after being less cautious in the beginning, when the awareness about resource constraint
becomes high, decisions are taken to make sacrifice at this time and to preserve the future. In
that case, the lower is δmin, the stronger is the growth rate which result in a smaller number
of generations that is sacrificed with respect to the determinist economy. Figure 1 illustrates
consumption paths in this case.
In case two, if δmin ρ−λδmin−λ < ρ, then g
(3) > g(1) and c(3)0 < c
(1)
0 . In that case, between the date
0 and T , the economy with uncertainty will start with a lower level of consumption and will follow
a more conservative path along this period. At the date T , the consumption level takes down also
to a lower level and hereafter follows a path with a higher growth rate. The overall economy with
change in the discount factor is therefore more cautious in the beginning until the change arrives.
In that case, it is the generations before the change occurs at date T that are sacrificed. That is to
say, the worst-case scenario allows in that case to follow an economic path that pay more attention
to future generations interests. Figure 2 illustrates this case.
The interesting question becomes therefore, not to know the level of discount rate to apply, but to
know when it is optimal to make the change in discount factor. Our approach is suggesting that it
is better in terms of intergenerational equity to behave as if the future is beginning today and to
make the change immediately. As it is shown in the program P (2), taking a lower discount rate
allows to follow an optimal path with a higher growth rate, but it implies also to make the sacrifice
in terms of consumption level today if we make the change today in order to preserve possibilities
of consumption paths for future generations.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper develops a prescriptive approach on the debate on discounting the very long term. Our
purpose was to tackle the issue of how to discount the distant-future when we consider environ-
mental questions and the uncertainty inherent to this horizon.
The adoption of the worst-case scenario approach leads to choose the lowest possible discount rate.
This gives more value to future generations well-being on the social welfare function but also oﬀers
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Figure 1: Consumption paths: case 1: δmin ρ−λδmin−λ > ρ
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Figure 2: Consumption paths: case 2: δmin ρ−λδmin−λ < ρ
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room for manoeuvre if events turn bad. Finally, considering the uncertainty on the date at which
the change on the discount rate should be made, our model invites to make the change immediately.
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